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COMMENTS
REPRESENTING NONCITIZENS IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:
RESOLVING UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY
Kara B. Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that an
attorney is obligated to tell a noncitizen client that pleading guilty to a
crime may result in the client’s forced removal from the United States.1
The defendant, Jose Padilla, claimed that his counsel failed to advise him
that choosing to plead guilty might result in his deportation. This failure,
Padilla argued, violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel.2 The Court agreed: “constitutionally competent counsel would
have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject
to automatic deportation.”3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned
that “[o]ur longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of
deportation as a risk of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of
deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.”4
Two major issues remain unresolved in the wake of this pivotal
opinion. First, the Supreme Court did not say whether its decision should
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. To date, only three federal
circuit courts have decided whether defendants whose convictions are final
should be able to seek relief based on Padilla.5 As a result, most lower
*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2012; B.A.,
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1
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
2
Id. at 1481–82.
3
Id. at 1478.
4
Id. at 1486.
5
United States v. Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 30,
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courts are forced to revisit this issue anew every time a defendant raises
Padilla to challenge a final conviction. Second, it is uncertain whether
Padilla will actually prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Court remanded the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court
because it concluded that Padilla’s entitlement to relief “will depend on
whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a result [of counsel’s deficient
performance], a question we do not reach because it was not passed on
below.”6
Further clarification of these issues is imperative. These issues impact
the lives of some of the most vulnerable people in the country—
noncitizens. Today, noncitizens, whether illegal aliens or lawful permanent
residents, can be removed from the United States for even the most minor
drug offenses.7 Once removed, the individual is often barred from coming
back to the United States.8 So for an individual without United States
citizenship, being found guilty in a criminal case means facing punishment
associated not just with the crime itself, but also with the individual’s legal
status in the country. In light of these high stakes, federal and state courts
throughout the United States require guidance to address immigration issues
in criminal proceedings in a way that is uniform, just, and efficient.
Lacking such guidance, they must apply the standard announced in Padilla,
but with little direction as to whether the decision allows for retroactive
application and what kind of “prejudice” a noncitizen defendant must prove
to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This Comment argues that Padilla v. Kentucky should be applied
retroactively because it did not announce a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure. Next, this Comment argues that Jose Padilla was
“prejudiced” and therefore meets the requirement under Strickland v.
Washington for showing that his Sixth Amendment right was violated.9
Part II provides the background for this Comment, beginning in Part
II.A with a description of the recent convergence of immigration and
criminal law. Part II.B provides background on the Sixth Amendment and

2011) (holding that Padilla announced a new rule and is not retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review); Chaidez v. United States, No. 10-3623, 2011 WL 3705173, at *1 (7th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (same); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 634 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that Padilla did not announce a new rule and is retroactively applicable).
6
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487.
7
Id. at 1477 n.1.
8
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 41–44 (2010),
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/REVISED Padilla v. Kentucky Reference
Guide_11-8-10.pdf (discussing the grounds for inadmissibility and bars on readmission).
9
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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Strickland v. Washington. Part II.C explores implications of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Padilla and the standard for retroactivity under Teague
v. Lane. Part III provides support for the arguments that Padilla should be
applied retroactively and that on remand, Jose Padilla should prevail on his
claim.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE NEW “CRIMMIGRATION” SYSTEM

Between 2003 and 2008, the United States government removed
nearly 1.5 million noncitizens from the country.10 In the last decade, the
number of foreign nationals deported from the United States has doubled. 11
The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky recognized that these numbers
increased so dramatically because of changes in immigration law.12 In fact,
the Court appeared concerned with the increasingly punitive nature of
criminal law for noncitizens.13 The lack of consensus in the opinion,
however, highlights the controversies lying at the heart of the case related to
immigration and criminal law.14
Criminal law in the United States is a harsh and unpredictable system
for noncitizens.15 In the first paragraph of the opinion, the Court observes
that “Padilla’s crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the
most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense.”16 Given the
state of the law, the Court stressed that deportation for noncitizens who
commit a removable offense is “practically inevitable,” barring a decision
by the Attorney General to exercise his limited discretionary power to
cancel removal.17
10

See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1565 (2010)
(stating that 1,446,338 noncitizens were removed from the United States between 2003 and
2008).
11
Kyung Jin Lee, U.S. Deportations Double over 10 Years, MEDILL REPORTS (Feb. 23,
2010), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=157904.
12
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–79.
13
See id.
14
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Alito concurred, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. See id. at 1477.
15
See Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know
the Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47, 48 (2010)
(“Noncitizen criminal defendants find themselves on unequal footing with U.S. citizen
defendants. Noncitizens are often subjected to disparate treatment in bail and sentencing
because of their immigration status.”) (citations omitted).
16
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
17
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
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Padilla thus deals with an area of law that has harsh consequences for
defendants who often have little or no knowledge of the American legal
system and whose criminal defense attorneys may not adequately research
the impact of the defendant’s immigration status on their criminal case.18
The Court’s discussion reflects a theme recognized by scholars and
commentators: the increasing criminalization of immigration.19 Others refer
to the new “crimmigration system.”20 Indeed, “the preoccupation with
enforcement has left noncitizens in deportation proceedings exposed to
large risks of error when the personal stakes are high.”21 The potential
consequences—being forced to leave the United States and to separate from
one’s family—are serious. According to Professor Cruz, “[w]ithout
knowledge of the immigration consequences of a conviction, or the
individual’s eligibility for immigration relief in general, defense counsel
may not be able to diffuse the fears that cloud the noncitizen judgment,
resulting in hasty plea decisions.”22 As a result, she argues, “[i]gnorance
and marginalization of immigration law in the adjudication of a criminal
case involving a noncitizen can be catastrophic.”23
Before analyzing the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Padilla described how changes in federal immigration
law over the last century “have expanded the class of deportable offenses
and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of
deportation.”24 As a result, the Court observed, “[t]he ‘drastic measure’ of
deportation or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of
noncitizens convicted of crimes.”25 The Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) sets forth classes of deportable aliens.26 For example, if an alien is
convicted of two or more crimes of moral turpitude, he or she is
automatically deportable. As for drug offenses, the law reads:
[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or
18

Id. at 1483 (“Some members of the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges,
in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in [immigration law].”).
19
Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 476 (2007).
20
See, e.g., Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost
Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 670 (2008); Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367
(2006).
21
Legomsky, supra note 19, at 469.
22
Cruz, supra note 15, at 61–62.
23
Id. at 62.
24
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
25
Id.
26
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
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a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a single offense
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is
27
deportable.

In light of the state of the law, the Court insisted that accurate legal
advice for noncitizens in criminal proceedings “has never been more
important” because “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”28
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

Because of Padilla, defendants in deportation proceedings can now
contend that their counsel was deficient for not advising that their guilty
plea could lead to deportation. However, as the Court recognized, “it is
often quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to
satisfy” the standard under the seminal case of Strickland v. Washington.29
That standard requires defendants to show both that counsel’s performance
was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.”30 The first prong of Strickland’s two-prong test
requires that, “[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.”31 The second prong, known as the prejudice prong,
requires the defendant to “show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.”32 A defendant seeking to prevail on a Strickland claim must
show that both prongs have been satisfied.33
Because it is so common for defendants to plead guilty in criminal
proceedings,34 the Court has “long recognized that the negotiation of a plea
27

Id.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
29
Id. at 1485 n.12; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
30
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
32
Id. at 687; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (“[T]o satisfy
[Strickland’s] ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.”).
33
See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289 (2000) (“[The defendant] must satisfy both
prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel.”).
34
Joanne Gottesman, Avoiding the “Secret Sentence”: A Model for Ensuring that New
28
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bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel.”35 The overwhelming majority of
criminal convictions result from guilty pleas.36 When a defendant enters a
guilty plea, that plea must “represent[] a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”37 Hill v.
Lockhart established that Strickland applies to an attorney’s advice
regarding a guilty plea.38 Therefore, a defendant can successfully argue that
his or her guilty plea was not “voluntary and intelligent” if the defendant
can show that defense counsel was constitutionally deficient and that the
defendant pled guilty as a result.
C. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

1. Jose Padilla’s Path to the U.S. Supreme Court
Defendant Jose Padilla was born in Honduras but lived in the United
States as a legal permanent resident for over forty years.39 He also served
his country as a member of the United States military during the Vietnam
War.40 In 2001, Padilla was indicted for and pled guilty to trafficking
marijuana.41 In 2004, Padilla found himself in deportation proceedings.42
Realizing he was in deportation proceedings because of his guilty plea,
Padilla filed a petition for postconviction relief43 on the grounds that he was
Jersey Criminal Defendants Are Advised About Immigration Consequences Before Entering
Guilty Pleas, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 357, 359 (2009).
35
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
36
Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 697 (2002) ( “[O]ver ninety percent
of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas.”).
37
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
38
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (“We hold . . . that the two-part Strickland v.
Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.”).
39
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
40
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008).
41
Id. (“Padilla was indicted . . . for trafficking in more than five pounds of marijuana,
possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer
without a weight and distance tax number. Padilla, represented by counsel, moved to enter a
guilty plea to the three drug-related charges, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining
charge, and a total sentence of ten years on all charges. The plea agreement provided that
Padilla would serve five years of his ten year sentence, and would be sentenced to probation
for the remaining five years. Final judgment was entered October 4, 2002.”).
42
Id. Under immigration law, any noncitizen who commits an aggravated felony, as
Padilla did, is automatically deportable. See supra Part II.A; OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
LITIGATION, supra note 8, at 9; see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (noting that Padilla’s
guilty plea made his deportation “virtually mandatory”).
43
The purpose of postconviction relief is
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denied his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. In his petition, Padilla contended that his counsel should have
informed him that pleading guilty might have negative immigration
consequences. Instead, his counsel allegedly told him not to worry about
immigration status because of the amount of time he had been in the
country.44
After the trial court denied Padilla’s motion for postconviction relief,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.45 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that Padilla did
not have a claim for relief.46 It reasoned that because “collateral
consequences are outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, it follows that counsel’s failure to advise
Appellee of such collateral issue or his act of advising Appellee incorrectly
provides no basis for relief.”47 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide “whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla’s counsel
had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading
guilty would result in his removal from this country.”48
Overruling the Kentucky Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to advise
Padilla that his drug conviction rendered him vulnerable to automatic
deportation.49 It concluded that given the seriousness of deportation as a
consequence of a guilty plea, “advice regarding deportation is not
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”50
Furthermore, “[o]ur longstanding Sixth Amendment
precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a risk of a criminal plea, and
the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this
country demand no less.”51
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
argument that because deportation is a collateral consequence of a criminal

to provide a means of inquiry into the alleged constitutional infirmity of a judgment or sentence,
and to afford a simple and efficient remedy to any prisoner who claims that his or her conviction
was obtained by a disregard of the fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.

24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2223 (2006).
44
Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 483 (stating that Padilla’s counsel allegedly advised that “he
‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long’”).
45
Id. at 484.
46
Id. at 485.
47
Id.
48
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1482.
51
Id. at 1486.
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conviction, counsel is not required to advise his client of possible
deportation.52 The Court acknowledged that the distinction between direct
and collateral consequences was not entirely clear. However, the Court had
never applied the direct–collateral distinction in the context of a Strickland
claim.53 Even so, the distinction was not at issue in Padilla’s case “because
of the unique nature of deportation.”54 The close link between deportation
and the criminal process made deportation “uniquely difficult to classify as
either a direct or collateral consequence.”55 Finding that Padilla could raise
a Strickland claim, the Court then applied the first prong of the Strickland
analysis—whether counsel’s representation “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.”56 The Court held that counsel’s performance
was not objectively reasonable because current professional norms dictated
that attorneys must advise clients of deportation risks in criminal
proceedings and because counsel should have realized that Padilla was
deportable “simply from reading the text of the [immigration] statute.”57
Finally, the Court concluded that “[i]t is our responsibility under the
Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen or
not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”58 The serious
consequences of not protecting noncitizen defendants from this risk
included “the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully
in this country.”59
2. Implications of the Decision
For some observers, Padilla marks a transformation in the criminal
justice system.60 Padilla requires defense attorneys who were not “well
versed” in immigration law before to have at least some understanding of
immigration law.61 To that end, the federal government, as well as many
state governments, have issued new manuals to train attorneys.62 The U.S.
52

Id. at 1481.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1482.
56
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 686, 688 (1984).
57
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83.
58
Id. at 1486 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
59
Id.
60
Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v.
Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21, 21 (“There are only a handful of Supreme Court
decisions in the past 50 years that can be said to have transformed the operation of the
criminal justice system. Padilla v. Kentucky may be such a case.”).
61
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, supra note 8.
62
The Department of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation in 2010 issued a
comprehensive overview of the Immigration and Nationality Act provisions relevant to
53
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Department of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation acknowledged
that because of Padilla, “it is even more important than ever for
prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, and other interested parties at the
federal and local levels to have a basic understanding of the immigration
consequences that flow from an alien’s guilty plea.”63
For noncitizen defendants, Padilla provides a better chance to
challenge their criminal convictions in cases where they did not realize that
pleading guilty could lead to removal from the United States. The Court’s
decision, however, does not guarantee criminal defendants a successful
challenge to their guilty pleas.64 Padilla only addressed the first prong of
the Strickland two-prong test and left open the question of whether
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.65
After Padilla, a defendant may assert that if it were not for counsel’s
bad advice, he or she would have chosen to go to trial rather than entering a
guilty plea. However, because in most cases the defendant’s conviction is
already final, the defendant must collaterally challenge that conviction by
filing a federal habeas corpus or state postconviction petition.
Still, Supreme Court decisions do not always apply to collateral review
of convictions that became final before the Supreme Court issues its new
opinion. In such cases, the Supreme Court has held that “new”
constitutional rules of criminal procedure should not apply to these cases.66
Therefore, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are generally not
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.67
Federal and state courts applying Padilla have ruled differently on the
issue of whether the case announced a new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure. If the Court in Padilla announced a new constitutional rule of

noncitizens facing criminal charges. The ninety-two-page guide’s purpose is to help judges
and attorneys “in understanding the immigration consequences of an alien’s guilty plea in a
criminal case.” Id.
63
Id. at i.
64
See, e.g., Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693, 698 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Padilla . . . has no bearing on our decision in this case because we need not decide whether
Wertz’s performance was deficient to reach our conclusion that Hutchings was not
prejudiced and therefore not entitled to habeas relief.”); Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV4938 (ARR), 2010 WL 2076020, at *3–4 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010) (“Even if petitioner’s
motion were timely, and assuming that he has sufficiently shown that trial counsel failed to
advise him or misadvised him of the immigration consequences of his plea under Padilla v.
Kentucky, I cannot find that he would meet the second prong of Strickland.”).
65
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
66
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to the
general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.”).
67
Id.
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criminal procedure, as some lower courts have decided that it did, then it
cannot be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless it falls
under two narrow exceptions.68 This Comment argues that Padilla applied
the familiar Strickland v. Washington standard of effective assistance of
counsel to a new set of facts.69 Therefore, retroactive application of
Padilla’s rule is warranted.
D. THE TEAGUE V. LANE STANDARD OF RETROACTIVITY

1. The Teague v. Lane Decision
The Court’s 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane, which governs whether
a decision can be applied retroactively to criminal cases on collateral
review, provides the basis for evaluating the retroactivity of Padilla.70
Under Teague, “a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or “if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.”71 Whereas new rules only apply to cases on
collateral review in certain circumstances, rules already in existence
(“dictated by precedent”) apply to cases on direct and collateral review.72
In Teague, an African-American defendant argued that his conviction
by an all-white jury violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury trial.73
The defendant, on collateral appeal, urged the Court to conclude that he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right because he was not “tried by a jury that
was representative of the community.”74 He based his argument on Taylor
v. Louisiana, where the Court held that under the Sixth Amendment the jury
venire must be “drawn from a source fairly representative of the
community.”75 A plurality of the Court, however, stated that it would not
68

The two exceptions to the general non-retroactivity rule for cases on collateral review
are: first, for a rule that places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” and second, for a “watershed
rule[] of criminal procedure,” which essentially means that it “requires the observance of
‘those procedures that . . . are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’” Id. at 311
(citing Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971)).
69
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
70
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
71
Id. at 301.
72
See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
73
Teague, 489 U.S. at 292–93.
74
Id. at 293, 299.
75
Id. at 292 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). The defendant
also argued that he should benefit from Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Court changed the
evidentiary standard for a defendant to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination when
a prosecutor challenges members of the jury venire. However, the Court rejected the
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address the central question: whether the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross
section requirement should extend to the petit jury.76 The Court explained
that the defendant’s proposal would constitute a new rule.77 The Court
proceeded to analyze and reformulate its retroactivity jurisprudence,
determining that even if it were to adopt the defendant’s proposed rule, as a
new rule it would be inapplicable on collateral appeal.78
Accordingly, the Teague Court concluded that a new constitutional
rule of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively to cases on direct
review, but not to cases on collateral review.79 The Court noted that the
distinction between cases on direct review versus collateral review is a
sharp one.80 On direct review, a defendant directly appeals a finding of a
lower court, and therefore, the defendant’s conviction is not yet final. By
contrast, on collateral review, the defendant’s conviction is final and the
defendant is petitioning for relief from that conviction.81 However, if the
case involves an “old rule,” it applies both collaterally and on direct
review.82
Teague is considered a landmark decision83 because it rejected the ad
hoc approach of Linkletter v. Walker and established a more concrete test
for deciding whether a rule should be applied to cases on collateral
review.84 The Court announced:
It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule, and we
do not attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule
for retroactivity purposes. In general, however, a case announces a new rule when it

defendant’s contention based on its prior holding that Batson was not retroactive on
collateral review. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294–96 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–
97; Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258).
76
Id. at 292.
77
Id. at 301 (“Given the strong language in Taylor and our statement in Akins v. Texas,
that ‘[f]airness in [jury] selection has never been held to require proportional representation
of races upon a jury,’ application of the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would
be a new rule.”).
78
Id. at 310.
79
Id. at 310. Notably, Teague has been determined to apply to procedural, not
substantive, rules. See Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 816 (7th Cir. 2005); Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (“Teague by its own terms applies only to procedural
rules . . . .”).
80
Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (noting “the important distinction between direct and
collateral review”) (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 215 (1988)).
81
See, e.g., Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 58 (1985) (discussing the distinction
between direct and collateral review).
82
See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).
83
Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standards of Review for Habeas Corpus Under the
New 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1870 (1997).
84
See Teague, 489 U.S. at 300; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
85
Government.

The Court also emphasized that when a court makes a decision announcing
a new rule, it should also decide, at that time, if its decision is retroactive.86
2. Teague v. Lane’s Progeny
Teague v. Lane appears to have caused as much confusion as it sought
to resolve.87 The Court itself has said that its Teague jurisprudence is
“confused and confusing.”88 Although Teague remains good law and courts
continue to apply the basic logic of the opinion, the reasoning behind
subsequent decisions does not always appear consistent.
Although Teague was a plurality opinion, later that same year, a
majority of the Court endorsed it in Penry v. Lynaugh.89 In Penry, the
defendant sought federal habeas relief from a murder conviction and
sentence of death.90 The Court held that the rule that Penry sought to apply
to his case was not a new rule.91 The rule had been articulated in Jurek v.
Texas, where the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment required
the person deciding the defendant’s sentence to be allowed to consider all
relevant mitigating evidence.92 According to the Court, Penry’s claim did
not require the application of a new rule because “the relief Penry seeks
does not ‘impos[e] a new obligation’ on the State of Texas . . . . Rather,
Penry simply asks the State to fulfill the assurance upon which Jurek was
based.”93
By contrast, a year later in Butler v. McKellar, the Court held that the

85

Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
Id. at 300 (“[W]hether a decision [announcing a new rule should] be given prospective
or retroactive effect should be faced at the time of [that] decision.”) (citing Paul J. Mishkin,
Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79
HARV. L. REV. 56, 64 (1965)).
87
See, e.g., Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of
Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 815 (2003) (“[T]he ‘controversial
jurisprudence of “new” law’ seems far from settled.”).
88
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
89
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see also Shannon, supra note 87, at 823.
90
Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
91
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, Penry sought the benefit of a rule that when
mitigating evidence regarding his mental retardation and history of abuse is presented, Texas
juries must “be given jury instructions that make it possible for them to give effect to that
mitigating evidence in determining whether a defendant should be sentenced to death.” Id.
at 315.
92
428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976).
93
Penry, 492 U.S. at 315.
86
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particular case upon which defendant relied, Arizona v. Roberson,94
announced a new rule. The Court stated that before Roberson, there was
“significant difference of opinion” among lower courts, as well as between
two federal courts of appeals dealing with the Roberson issue, showing that
the result in Roberson was “susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds.”95 Still, the Court added that whether a decision comes “within the
‘logical compass’ of an earlier decision . . . is not conclusive for purposes of
deciding whether the current decision is a ‘new rule’ under Teague.”96
Just a few months later, in Sawyer v. Smith,97 the Supreme Court
provided further explanation for the motivation behind its decision in
Teague. The Teague rule, the Court explained, attempts to “ensure that
gradual developments in the law over which reasonable jurists may disagree
are not later used to upset the finality of state convictions valid when
entered.”98 This purpose relates to the underlying goal of federal habeas
corpus relief: “to ensure that state convictions comply with the federal law
in existence at the time the conviction became final, and not to provide a
mechanism for the continuing reexamination of final judgments based upon
later emerging legal doctrine.”99
In Saffle v. Parks, the Court stated that to determine whether a new
rule exists, a court must assess whether “a state court considering
[defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [defendant] seeks
was required by the Constitution.”100 The Court also declared, “[t]he
explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule.”101
Two years later, in Wright v. West, a state prisoner accused of grand larceny
sought habeas corpus relief.102 The Court stated that a rule is new if it “can
be meaningfully distinguished from that established by binding precedent at
the time his state court conviction became final.”103 Furthermore:
Even though we have characterized the new rule inquiry as whether ‘reasonable

94

486 U.S. 675 (1988).
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
96
Id.
97
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
98
Id. at 234.
99
Id.
100
494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); see also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997)
(“[W]e will not disturb a final state conviction or sentence unless it can be said that a state
court, at the time the conviction or sentence became final, would have acted objectively
unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought in federal court.”).
101
Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488.
102
505 U.S. 277, 282–84 (1992).
103
Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
95
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jurists’ could disagree as to whether a result is dictated by precedent . . . the standard
for determining when a case establishes a new rule is ‘objective,’ and the mere
104
existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new.

In Whorton v. Bockting, the Court held that its 2004 decision in
Crawford v. Washington announced a new constitutional rule of criminal
procedure.105 Crawford announced a new rule because it was not “dictated”
by precedent and its holding “[wa]s flatly inconsistent with the prior
governing precedent, Roberts, which Crawford overruled.”106 In other
cases, the Court has said that asking whether a decision is “dictated by
precedent” is the same as asking “whether no other interpretation was
reasonable.”107 Similarly, a rule is not dictated by precedent unless it would
be “apparent to all reasonable jurists.”108
In sum, it would be overly optimistic to find a bright-line rule in
Teague’s progeny. Because Teague requires a case-by-case analysis,
guidance can be found in the facts of a case and the rule a petitioner is
asking to be applied. The Court recently clarified that “the source of a ‘new
rule’ is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of
law.
Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our
articulation of the new rule.”109
III. DISCUSSION
This Comment argues two points. First, Padilla v. Kentucky applies
the Strickland standard for effective assistance of counsel to a new set of
facts; therefore it does not announce a new rule of criminal procedure.
While courts applying Padilla diverge on the issue of retroactivity, many
favor applying Padilla retroactively. Moreover, the arguments for
retroactivity are stronger than those in favor of only applying Padilla
104

Id.
549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007) (“[W]hile [petitioner’s] appeal was pending, we issued our
opinion in Crawford, in which we overruled Roberts and held that ‘[t]estimonial statements
of witnesses absent from trial’ are admissible ‘only where the declarant is unavailable, and
only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].’”).
106
Id. at 416. For other cases applying this Teague standard, see Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000).
107
Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 538 (1997) (“[T]he Teague inquiry—which is
applied to Supreme Court decisions that are, one must hope, usually the most reasonable
interpretation of prior law—requires more than that. It asks whether Espinosa was dictated
by precedent—i.e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable.”); see also Williams, 529
U.S. at 381 (“[A] federal habeas court operates within the bounds of comity and finality if it
applies a rule ‘dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became
final.’”) (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)).
108
Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added).
109
Danforth, 552 U.S. at 271.
105
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prospectively. Second, this Comment argues that Padilla can demonstrate
“prejudice,” as required under Strickland.
A. PADILLA’S IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

Judges across the country have lamented that the Padilla decision does
not say if it should apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.110
“Reasonable jurists” disagree about Padilla’s retroactive effect.111 As a
result, some federal habeas petitioners can successfully challenge their
convictions based on Padilla while others are barred from relying on
Padilla at all.
With federal circuit courts now split on whether Padilla can be
retroactively applied, the U.S. Supreme Court may soon need to revisit
Padilla.112 The Third Circuit first decided the issue, followed closely by the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits.113 In United States v. Orocio, the Third Circuit
unanimously held that Padilla did not announce a new rule and can be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.114 Rejecting the
government’s argument, the Third Circuit held that “because Padilla
followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional norms,
it is an ‘old rule’ . . . and is retroactively applicable on collateral review.”115
A split Seventh Circuit panel disagreed with the Third Circuit, finding in
Chaidez v. United States that Padilla announced a new rule.116 The Seventh
Circuit said it remained “persuaded by the weight of lower court authority
that, in 2004, a jurist could reasonably have reached a conclusion contrary
to the holding in Padilla.”117 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that Padilla
announced a new rule that did not apply retroactively.118

110
See, e.g., Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (“Padilla fails to resolve (or even discuss) retroactivity . . . .”);
United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, Nos. 1:07cr337 (LMB), 1:10cv618 (LMB), 2010 WL
2400006, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010).
111
People v. Obonaga, No. 07-CR-402 (JS), 2010 WL 2629748, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June
24, 2010); Llanes, 2011 WL 2473233, at *1 (“[N]o federal circuit court has addressed
Padilla’s retroactivity.”).
112
As of the date of publication, three federal circuit courts have ruled on the issue.
113
United States v. Hong, No. 10-6294, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 30,
2011); Chaidez v. United States, No. 10-3623, 2011 WL 3705173, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 23,
2011); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 634 (3d Cir. 2011).
114
645 F.3d at 634. Judge Chagares joined the majority’s decision that Padilla is
retroactive, and only dissented on the question of whether Orocio was prejudiced by his
counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id. at 647.
115
Id. at 641.
116
Chaidez, 2011 WL 3705173, at *4.
117
Id. at *6.
118
Hong, 2011 WL 3805763, at *1.
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The Third Circuit’s sound judgment should guide other federal circuit
courts, and ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court, on the issue of Padilla’s
retroactivity. Moreover, a number of decisions after Orocio suggest that
courts outside of the Third Circuit are persuaded by Orocio’s reasoning.119
By contrast, the Seventh and Tenth Circuit opinions fall short. For
example, the Chaidez majority adopted particular guiding principles under
Teague and its progeny as “absolute,” despite the Supreme Court’s recent
statement that its Teague jurisprudence is “confused and confusing.”120 The
majority also claimed that Padilla was not dictated by precedent in part
because the competing Padilla opinions expressed an “array of views” and
lower courts were split on the issue.121 Neither of these reasons is
dispositive in a new rule analysis, as explained below. In addition, the
Chaidez majority conceded that its holding considered Padilla a “rare
exception” to the rule that “the application of Strickland to unique facts
generally will not produce a new rule,” and that Strickland can resolve
“virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”122 But the majority
explained that Padilla was a “rare exception” only because the Court had
never before stated Padilla’s exact rule and because, if Padilla were an old
rule, it would be “hard to imagine an application of Strickland that would
qualify as a new rule.”123 However, as Judge Williams argued in dissent,
Padilla “simply clarified that a violation of [prevailing professional norms]
amounts to deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington.”124
Even before the courts of appeals ruled, a number of lower courts
applied Padilla retroactively.125 A New York state court held that Padilla
119

Rodriguez v. United States, No. 1:10–CV–23718–WKW [WO], 2011 WL 3419614,
at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2011) (“[T]he strong authority that Padilla is not a new rule,
including the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Orocio, and the authorities cited therein,
should have put litigants on notice of potential claims long before Padilla was handed
down.”); Song v. United States, Nos. CV 09–5184 DOC, CR 98–0806 CM, 2011 WL
2940316, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011) (“The instant Court’s conclusion that Padilla set
forth on ‘old rule’ to be applied retroactively on collateral review accords with the only
published circuit court decision on this issue.”) (citing Orocio, 645 F.3d 630); Constanza v.
State, No. A10-2096, 2011 WL 3557824, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011).
120
Chaidez, 2011 WL 3705173, at *7; Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271 (2008).
121
Chaidez, 2011 WL 3705173, at *11.
122
Id. at *7.
123
Id.
124
Id. at *9.
125
See, e.g., Amer v. United States, No. 1:06CR118–GHD, 2011 WL 2160553, at *2
(N.D. Miss. May 31, 2011); Luna v. United States, No. 10CV1659-JLS(POR), 2010 WL
4868062, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2010); United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6,
2010 WL 3184150, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2010); United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010); People v. Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d
806, 809 (App. Term 2010); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
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should be applied retroactively because the case “did not announce a new
constitutional rule, but merely applied the well-settled rule of Strickland to
a particular set of facts.”126 Reasoning that Padilla did not overrule any
“clear past precedent,” the court cited as support the Supreme Court’s 2000
opinion in Williams v. Taylor.127 In Williams, the Court addressed the
retroactivity of a case that applied Strickland and concluded that “it can
hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States.’”128 Similar to the New
York court, a California district court held that Padilla should be applied
retroactively because it “evinced an old rule.”129 In Texas, a petitioner was
allowed to benefit from Padilla even though he was convicted fourteen
years before Padilla was handed down.130 The Colorado Court of Appeals
did not decide if Padilla was retroactive but nevertheless said that Colorado
law had a history of acknowledging the same duties for counsel that Padilla
required.131
By contrast, some federal and state courts proclaim that Padilla should
not be applied retroactively.132 In People v. Kabre, a defendant sought
relief from three convictions related to trademark counterfeiting. He argued
that his counsel failed to advise him that there might be immigration
consequences to his guilty plea. In response, the New York trial court held
that Padilla announced a new rule and “is not to be applied retroactively on
collateral review of misdemeanor convictions.”133 The court applied the
Teague standard to determine if Padilla was dictated by precedent.134 The
court explained that not only did Padilla come to the opposite conclusion as
126
People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (Crim. Ct. 2010); see also Hubenig, 2010
WL 2650625, at *5 (“[S]pecific applications of Strickland do not generally establish a new
rule for purposes of Teague.”).
127
Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
128
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000).
129
Luna, 2010 WL 4868062, at *3.
130
Guadarrama-Melo v. United States, No. 1:08–CV–588, 2011 WL 2433619, at *3
(E.D. Tex. May 2, 2011).
131
People v. Kazadi, No. 09CA2640, 2011 WL 724754, at *3 (Colo. App. Mar. 3, 2011).
132
See, e.g., Llanes v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-682-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 2473233, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2011) (holding that Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply
retroactively); Doan v. United States, 760 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605 (E.D. Va. 2011) (stating that
Padilla announced a new rule); Haddad v. United States, Civil No. 07-12540, Criminal No.
97-80150, 2010 WL 2884645, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2010) (stating it is unlikely that
Padilla will be applied retroactively).
133
People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (Crim. Ct. 2010).
134
Id. at 892 (“Petitioner can prevail here only if a New York court in 2005 (when the
last conviction at issue here became final) would have been required by controlling United
States Supreme Court precedent to rule that failure to discuss the immigration consequences
of a guilty plea was ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
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the New York Court of Appeals did in 1995,135 but it also overruled a
significant number of federal and state court decisions.136 On the other
hand, the court acknowledged that before Padilla, New York precedent
dictated that where defense counsel does give advice about immigration
consequences, that advice should not be incorrect.137 Still, the court
declined to apply Padilla retroactively, “at least with respect to a
misdemeanor conviction,” because, the court said, in contrast to the
immigration consequences of a felony conviction, the immigration
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction are “often unclear.”138
Some courts decline to conclude anything about Padilla’s retroactivity
at all.139 Others decide the issue without much reasoning,140 or based on
disjointed or confusing reasoning. In United States v. Shafeek, pro se
defendant Shafeek collaterally attacked his bank fraud conviction.141
Finding first that “it appears that the rule announced [by Padilla] is not a
‘new rule,’” the Michigan district court held that “Shafeek cannot show that
the Padilla opinion should be applied retroactively.”142 This reasoning is
confused: if Padilla did not announce a new rule, then by default it was an
old rule, and therefore Shafeek could show that the decision should be
applied retroactively. Similarly, in Gacko v. United States, although the
parties did not raise the issue, the New York district court judge addressed
Padilla by finding that it did not support the defendant’s case because the
defendant could not show prejudice.143 The judge stated that “[w]hile this
decision clarified the obligation of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,
I cannot find that is a ‘newly recognized’ right that was made retroactively
135
See People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1995) (“Deportation is a collateral
consequence of conviction because it is a result peculiar to the individual’s personal
circumstances and one not within the control of the court system. Therefore, our Appellate
Division and the Federal courts have consistently held that the trial court need not, before
accepting a plea of guilty, advise a defendant of the possibility of deportation.”).
136
Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
137
Id. at 890.
138
Id.
139
See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Monreal, Nos. 1:07cr337 (LMB), 1:10cv618
(LMB), 2010 WL 2400006, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 14, 2010) (concluding, with little
reasoning, that defendant could not rely on Padilla to support his habeas petition).
140
People v. Obonaga, No. 07-CR-402 (JS), 2010 WL 2629748, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June
24, 2010) (finding that the Supreme Court was not clear on whether Padilla applies
retroactively and, “given this uncertainty, and the weakness of [defendant’s] substantive
claims, the Court elects to assume arguendo that Padilla applies retroactively”).
141
United States v. Shafeek, No. 05-81129, 2010 WL 3789747, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
22, 2010).
142
Id. at *3.
143
Gacko v. United States, No. 09-CV-4938 (ARR), 2010 WL 2076020, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
May 20, 2010).
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applicable to cases on collateral review as required by the statute.”144
B. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY

Padilla v. Kentucky should be applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review. Padilla did not announce a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure because it applied the Strickland standard to a new set of
facts. As others have acknowledged, “[t]he notion that a defense attorney
has a duty to advise his client properly before a plea is not new . . . .
[E]xpanding the rights of noncitizens at the time of plea based upon a
definitive deportation consequence is a new interpretation of effective
assistance of counsel.”145
Determining whether a decision is retroactive is hardly clear-cut. The
Supreme Court itself has recognized the difficulty in determining whether a
decision actually announces a new rule, or “whether it has simply applied a
well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely
analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case
law.”146 Padilla, however, falls within the latter category: it applied a wellestablished constitutional principle, the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, to a case similar to prior cases.
The strongest support for this argument is the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Williams v. Taylor. Williams suggested that where a court recognizes the
right to effective assistance of counsel, it generally does not announce a
new rule.147 Even if Williams cannot be read to announce such a categorical
rule, Teague v. Lane still mandates a finding that Padilla did not announce
a new rule. Accordingly, Padilla did not announce a new rule because (1)
Williams suggested a categorical rule for ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, (2) Padilla was based on “clearly established” law, (3) Padilla was
dictated by precedent, (4) in the opinion, the Court indicated that it should
be applied retroactively, and finally (5) both practical and policy concerns
weigh in favor of Padilla’s retroactivity.
1. Williams v. Taylor
The question of Padilla’s retroactivity can be best answered by
looking at the Supreme Court’s ruling in Williams v. Taylor. The Court in

144

Id.
John L. Holahan & Shauna Faye Kieffer, Padilla Motions, BENCH & BAR OF MINN.,
Aug. 2010, at 26 (emphasis added).
146
See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969).
147
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“[I]t can hardly be said that
recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States.’”).
145
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Williams addressed the question of how far the Strickland standard extends
before a new rule is announced. In the case, petitioner Williams sought
federal habeas relief from his capital murder conviction and the death
penalty. Williams contended that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
present significant mitigating evidence.148 As an initial matter, the Court
had to decide whether Williams sought to apply a new or old rule. It found
the question “easily answered” because “[i]t is past question that the rule set
forth in Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’”149 Further, “it can
hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States.’”150 The Court explained
that its precedent “dictated” that the Virginia Supreme Court apply
Strickland to Williams’s claim.151 Therefore, Williams suggests that where
a court recognizes a right to ineffective assistance of counsel, it generally
does not announce a new rule. A number of recent Supreme Court
decisions also support this argument.152
2. “Clearly Established” Law
Even if Williams cannot be read to announce such a categorical rule,
the “clearly established” standard mandates a finding that Padilla did not
announce a new rule. Teague’s prohibition on “reliance on ‘new rules’” has
been described as “the functional equivalent of a statutory provision
commanding exclusive reliance on ‘clearly established law.’”153 This
statutory provision, part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA),154 requires a state court in habeas proceedings to decide if a
defendant should be granted relief based on “clearly established Federal

148

Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 391.
150
Id. (“If the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case
examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific applications without
saying that those applications themselves create a new rule.”).
151
Id.
152
See United States v. Hubenig, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010)
(“The Supreme Court has issued a number of relatively recent opinions applying the
Strickland test in a variety of different factual contexts; none of these cases has been
afforded new rule status under Teague.”); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383,
393 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 391.
153
Glenda K. Harnad, Construction and Application of Teague Rule Concerning
Whether Constitutional Rule of Criminal Procedure Applies Retroactively to Case on
Collateral Review—Supreme Court Cases, 44 A.L.R. FED. 2D 557, 569–70 (2010).
154
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 104, 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(2006).
149
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law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”155 As stated
in Williams, the “source of clearly established law” is restricted to “this
Court’s jurisprudence.”156 Later in her opinion, Justice O’Connor stated
that “the ‘clearly established Federal law’ phrase bears only a slight
connection to our Teague jurisprudence.”157 However, Justice O’Connor
did not specify what the exact standard under Teague is or should be.158
Furthermore, a number of scholars have suggested that distinguishing new
and old rules under Teague requires looking at clearly established Federal
law as interpreted by the Supreme Court.159
Therefore, like in Williams, the law in question in Padilla was the
Strickland rule, which the Court has held qualifies as “clearly established
Federal law.” If neither Williams nor the “clearly established” standard
resolves the question of Padilla’s retroactivity, other factors weigh in favor
of finding that Padilla did not announce a new rule.
3. “Dictated by Precedent”
The argument that Padilla “was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant’s conviction became final”160 falls short because
every new application of an old precedent is not automatically labeled a
new rule. As an initial matter, “dictated by precedent” is open to
interpretation.161 Scholars note that the Supreme Court has suggested that
the phrase “dictated by precedent” should not be interpreted too
narrowly.162 In Stringer v. Black, the Court found that “[t]he purpose of the
new rule doctrine is to validate reasonable interpretations of existing
precedents.”163 Both Supreme Court and lower court precedent supports the
argument that the conclusion in Padilla was a reasonable interpretation of

155

Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 402–03 (2000) (quoting § 2254) (emphasis added).
Id. at 412.
157
Id.
158
See id.
159
See, e.g., Brian R. Means, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 7, at 367 (2010) (stating that
while one federal circuit court has stated otherwise, “[t]here is considerable authority
supporting the proposition that only the United States Supreme Court can establish a ‘new
rule’ of constitutional law for Teague purposes”).
160
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
161
7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(d) (3d ed. 2007) (“[I]n
Teague, it was far from clear as to how literally lower courts should read Justice O’Connor’s
reference to a result ‘not dictated’ by precedent.”).
162
Id.; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318–19 (1989).
163
503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992). The Court specified that “[r]easonableness, in this as in
many other contexts, is an objective standard, and the ultimate decision whether [the
decision at issue] was dictated by precedent is based on an objective reading of the relevant
cases.” Id.
156
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existing precedent.
i. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
In Sawyer v. Smith, the Supreme Court interpreted “dictated by
precedent” to mean that a new rule is announced where “we do not think a
state court viewing petitioner’s case at the time his conviction became final
could have concluded that our Eighth Amendment precedents compelled
such a rule.”164 The Court in Padilla, by contrast, explained that the rule
obliging counsel to tell clients about deportation risks is based on “[o]ur
longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents.”165 Therefore, at the time
Padilla’s conviction became final, a state court could have concluded that
the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment precedents compelled the rule
requiring counsel to inform him of deportation risks.
The result in Padilla was grounded in Supreme Court precedent.166
First, the Court itself stated that it has never distinguished between
collateral and direct consequences in a Sixth Amendment effective
assistance of counsel case.167 Although deportation has historically been
viewed as a collateral consequence of a conviction,168 it would nevertheless
fall within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment. In Hill v. Lockhart, the
Supreme Court declined to create a categorical rule barring collateral
consequences from the scope of what an attorney was obligated to tell a
client.169 Second, prior Supreme Court decisions recognize the importance
of deportation as a consequence of a guilty plea. In INS v. St. Cyr, the
Court acknowledged that “alien defendants considering whether to enter
into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of
their convictions.”170
The Court then quoted Matthew Bender:
“[p]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more
important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”171
Furthermore, no Supreme Court opinion foreclosed the possibility that
the Court would reach the conclusion that it did in Padilla. Padilla did not
overrule any prior Supreme Court decision because the Court has never
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not include the right to
164

497 U.S. 227, 238 (1990).
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
166
Id.
167
Id. at 1481.
168
See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2008),
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
169
474 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (noting that the court below, the Eighth Circuit, decided that
parole eligibility is a collateral, not direct, consequence of a guilty plea).
170
533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001).
171
Id. at 322–23 (citations omitted).
165
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be advised of potential immigration consequences. Admittedly, if a
decision did not explicitly overrule a prior decision, it is more difficult to
determine if a new rule was created.172 However, cases where the Supreme
Court announces a new rule often explicitly overrule a prior decision. For
example, Crawford v. Washington announced a new rule because it
overruled Ohio v. Roberts.173 In Allen v. Hardy, the Court held that the rule
in Batson v. Kentucky was “an explicit and substantial break with prior
precedent” because it “overruled [a] portion of Swain.”174
ii. Lower Court Precedent
Some scholars note that Padilla effectively overruled a number of state
and federal decisions.175 However, as seen in Sawyer, the Court’s focus is
on whether a state court “could have concluded that our Eighth Amendment
precedents compelled such a rule.”176 Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s
Sixth Amendment precedent determines whether the Court announced a
new rule in Padilla. The focus should not be on how many lower court
opinions the Court overruled. A finding that federal or state courts have
ruled contrary to a Supreme Court’s decision is not dispositive of whether
the Supreme Court announced a new rule.
Courts have found that a Supreme Court opinion overruling precedents
from several federal circuits nevertheless did not announce a new rule. In
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court held that Strickland applies where
defense counsel fails to file a notice of appeal on behalf of a client.177 As a
result, the Court overruled the per se rule from several federal circuits
stating that “defense counsel had a duty to file a notice of appeal in all
cases, except where the defendant affirmatively consented to refrain from
filing an appeal.”178 Later, the Ninth Circuit held that Flores-Ortega did
not announce a new rule, stating: “Flores-Ortega broke no new ground in
holding that reasonably effective performance requires a defense attorney to
discuss an appeal with her client whenever there is a rational basis to think

172
See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (“The explicit overruling of an
earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine
whether we announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases.”).
173
See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007).
174
478 U.S. 255, 258 (1986).
175
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179,
204 (2010) (“While the decision is not inconsistent with the Court’s prior opinions, it
overturns nearly unanimous agreement among state and federal courts.”).
176
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 238 (1990) (emphasis added).
177
528 U.S. 470 (2000).
178
Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007).
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that her client should appeal.”179 The court explained that Strickland’s
application to ineffective assistance of counsel claims was well-established
and the ruling in Flores-Ortega was supported by American Bar
Association standards and indications in the Court’s own precedent.180
Yet one New York judge observed that Padilla “overruled decisions
from ten of the federal circuit courts and twenty-three states, and certainly
has in this sense established a new rule in those jurisdictions.”181 In United
States v. Fry, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that counsel was not
deficient for failing to tell the defendant that he could be deported as a
result of a conviction.182 Looking to other circuits, the Ninth Circuit found
consensus that “deportation is a collateral consequence of the criminal
process and hence the failure to advise does not amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel.”183 However, other courts have found that erroneous
advice, as opposed to a failure to advise, does amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel.184
The Supreme Court has “long required effective assistance of counsel
on all important decisions in plea bargaining that could affect the outcome
of the plea process.”185 Therefore, the claim that Padilla overturned

179

Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1141–42. The Court noted that “both from Supreme Court precedent and as a
matter of common sense . . . the decision whether to appeal requires reasoned legal advice
from counsel.” Id. at 1142.
181
People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 896 (Crim. Ct. July 22, 2010) (“‘Dictated by
precedent’ is not the only formulation of the rule. Another factor is whether the Supreme
Court has overruled past authority: a decision which overrules a prior case is obviously a
new rule. Padilla did not . . . overrule any prior Supreme Court decision because there were
no prior decisions which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel applied to advice on a consequence hithertofore considered collateral. The decision
in Padilla effectively did overrule decisions from ten of the federal circuit courts and twentythree states, and certainly has in this sense established a new rule in those jurisdictions.”)
(citation omitted).
182
322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003).
183
Id. (quoting United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also United
States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6,
7 (4th Cir. 1988).
184
See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1015–17 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Choi, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (“I assume without deciding
that the attorney had no duty to advise Choi on the subject of deportation at all. But when
Choi asked, the attorney could not properly provide an incorrect answer, without making an
objectively reasonable effort to learn the truth.”). It should be noted that while the Court
acknowledged the misadvice versus failure to advise distinction in Padilla, it ultimately
refused to make the distinction in reaching its holding. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1484 (2010) (“There is no relevant difference ‘between an act of commission and an act of
omission’ in this context.”).
185
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 638 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
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“unanimous” judicial agreement overstates the reality because many recent
federal and state court rulings in fact paved the way for Padilla.186
According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Padilla correctly pointed out
that “a number of jurisdictions which have held that failure to advise of a
collateral matter is not ineffective assistance have nevertheless held that
there is an exception for cases where the attorney misadvised the defendant
on the consequences of his plea with regard to immigration.”187 In 2002,
the Second Circuit held that “affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively
unreasonable.”188 In another opinion, the Second Circuit stated that
removal for noncitizens is “not merely a collateral matter outside the scope
of counsel’s duty to provide effective representation.”189 In 2004, the
Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that a defense attorney was ineffective
because he misrepresented to his client that there would be no negative
immigration consequences of her guilty plea.190 The New Mexico Supreme
Court, departing from Tenth Circuit precedent, ruled that an “attorney’s
non-advice to an alien defendant on the immigration consequences of a
guilty plea would also be deficient performance.”191
4. Indications of Retroactivity in the Padilla Decision
Some courts claim that Padilla is devoid of any indication that it
should be applied retroactively.192 Yet several passages in the opinion
suggest that the Court expected retroactive application. The Court stated:
It seems unlikely that our decision today will be have a significant effect on those
convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15
186
Id. at 640 (“Lower court decisions not in harmony with Padilla were, with few
exceptions, decided before 1995 and pre-date the professional norms that, as the Padilla
court recognized, had long demanded that competent counsel provide advice on the removal
consequences of a client’s plea.”).
187
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484–85 (Ky. 2008) (citing State v. RojasMartinez, 125 P.3d 930, 935 (Utah 2005)); see also United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005
(9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2002); Downs-Morgan v.
United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1539–41 (11th Cir. 1985)); Gonzalez v. State, 83 P.3d 921
(Or. Ct. App. 2004).
188
Cuoto, 311 F.3d at 188.
189
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir.
1986)) (“Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen’s
ability to remain in the country was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing
process—not merely a collateral matter outside the scope of counsel’s duty to provide
effective representation.”).
190
Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796, 799–800 (Ga. 2004).
191
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004).
192
See, e.g., United States v. Shafeek, Nos. 05-81129, 10-12670, 2010 WL 3789747, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 22, 2010).
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years, professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide
193
advice on the deportation consequences of a client’s plea.

The Court also found it “significant that the plea form currently used in
Kentucky courts provides notice of possible immigration consequences.”194
Finally, the argument for Padilla’s retroactivity is grounded in the
reality that although our fundamental constitutional principles do not
change, the nation does.195 Strickland, in particular, is not stagnant:
“Strickland did not freeze into place the objective standards of attorney
performance prevailing in 1984, never to change again.”196
5. Practical and Policy Considerations
Even if Padilla were determined to be a new rule and therefore nonretroactive, a state court can still decide to give effect to Padilla in deciding
a case on collateral review. The Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minnesota
held that the Teague rule does not prohibit state courts from giving “broader
effect” to a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure than required by
the Supreme Court in the opinion at issue.197 Limiting the Teague rule to
the context of federal habeas relief means that Teague does not necessarily
impact state courts considering postconviction petitions.
Moreover, the concern that Padilla will open the “floodgates” for
defendants seeking to challenge their convictions is likely unfounded. The
Supreme Court deemed it “unlikely” that its decision would have
“significant effect” on already final convictions.198 Professional norms
already obligate attorneys to give clients advice about the risk of
deportation in guilty pleas.199 Additionally, the cases decided since Padilla

193

Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485; see also People v. Bennett, 903 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (Crim.
Ct. 2010) (“[I]f the Supreme Court did not intend for Padilla to be retroactively applied, that
would render meaningless the majority’s lengthy discussion about concerns that Padilla
would open the ‘floodgates’ of challenges to guilty pleas.”).
194
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 n.15.
195
In Justice Harlan’s words: “One need not be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to
recognize that many, though not all, of this Court’s constitutional decisions are grounded
upon fundamental principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to year,
but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation.”
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
196
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 640 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted)
(emphasizing that Strickland relies “on the legal profession’s maintenance of standards”).
197
552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (“The question in this case is whether Teague constrains the
authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is
required by that opinion. We have never suggested that it does, and now hold that it does
not.”).
198
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
199
Id.
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demonstrate that defendants still face many hurdles to obtaining relief.
These hurdles include the one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas
petitions and the limits of postconviction remedies.200 In addition, as will
be discussed below, a successful Strickland claim requires the defendant to
show he or she was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct.
In sum, Padilla should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review because it did not overrule any Supreme Court decision and finds
support in Supreme Court, federal, and state precedent.
C. PADILLA SHOULD PREVAIL UNDER STRICKLAND’S “PREJUDICE
PRONG”

The Kentucky Supreme Court has not yet decided the question on
remand from the U.S. Supreme Court: whether Jose Padilla is entitled to
relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.201 The Kentucky
court must address whether a noncitizen defendant who has entered a guilty
plea for a crime can show prejudice under the standard established in
Strickland where his counsel failed to advise him that his guilty plea could
lead to his forced removal from the United States. Padilla succeeded in
showing that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.”202 However, Padilla must now demonstrate that his
counsel’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”203
1. Demonstrating “Prejudice” in the Context of a Guilty Plea
The Supreme Court noted that on remand, Padilla may face an uphill
battle: “it is often quite difficult for petitioners who have acknowledged
their guilt to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.”204 The prejudice prong
requires the defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.”205 A reasonable probability is a probability “sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.”206 The Supreme Court requires a
defendant to show prejudice because “[a]n error by counsel, even if
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of

200

See, e.g., Diaz v. Brown, No. 10-CV-0457M, 2011 WL 677476, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Feb. 16, 2011); State v. Chavez, 246 P.3d 1219, 1219–20 (Utah Ct. App. 2011).
201
Id. at 1487.
202
Id. at 1486–87; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
203
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
204
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.12. The Court also states that “[s]urmounting
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Id. at 1485.
205
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
206
Id.
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a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”207
Ultimately, whether a defendant meets the standard of showing prejudice is
a fact-based inquiry.208
To assess prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a court must apply
the legal standard found in Hill v. Lockhart209: “in order to satisfy the
‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.”210 In Hill v. Lockhart, the
petitioner’s argument failed because he did not allege that if counsel
properly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have
chosen to go to trial instead of pleading guilty.211 In addition, petitioner
“alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he
placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or
not to plead guilty.”212
In some cases, a defendant need not show that rejecting a plea bargain
“would have been rational under the circumstances” because prejudice may
be presumed.213 The Supreme Court in Roe v. Flores-Ortega established
that prejudice must be presumed where there is a “serious denial of the
entire judicial proceeding.”214 Flores-Ortega was an “unusual” case
because the reliability of the judicial proceeding was not in question.215
Instead, counsel’s errors “deprived respondent of more than a fair judicial
proceeding; that deficiency deprived respondent of the appellate proceeding
altogether.”216 The Court explained: “Like the decision whether to appeal,
the decision whether to plead guilty (i.e., waive trial) rested with the
defendant and, like this case, counsel’s advice in Hill might have caused the
defendant to forfeit a judicial proceeding to which he was otherwise
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Id. at 691.
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000) (“As with all applications of the
Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will
turn on the facts of a particular case.”).
209
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“The governing legal standard plays a critical role in
defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel’s errors.”); see also
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 n.12 (“Whether Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim follows from
Hill [v. Lockhart] . . . .”).
210
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Hutchings v. United States, 618 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.
2010).
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Hill, 474 U.S. at 53.
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Id. at 60.
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Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
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528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000).
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entitled.”217 The Supreme Court also stated that “grossly deficient
performance” by counsel may constitute prejudice.218
Even if prejudice is not presumed, a defendant can demonstrate that it
would have been rational for him to reject a plea offer.219 As the Third
Circuit stressed in United States v. Orocio, the inquiry is whether the
attorney’s ineffective conduct “affected the outcome of the plea process.”220
The Supreme Court “has never required an affirmative demonstration of
likely acquittal at such a trial as the sine qua non of prejudice.”221 A court
should ask only whether the defendant would have “rationally gone to trial
in the first place.”222 This rationality test should be straightforward for a
noncitizen defendant like Padilla who “might rationally be more concerned
with removal [from the United States] than with a term of
imprisonment.”223
2. The Case for Padilla
On remand, the Kentucky Supreme Court should focus on whether
counsel’s performance affected the outcome of the plea process, not what
the outcome of Padilla’s hypothetical trial would have been.224 The U.S.
Supreme Court in Padilla should have gone further to acknowledge the
impact of Flores-Ortega on Padilla’s case. Like the defendant in FloresOrtega, Padilla was denied “the entire judicial proceeding,” any trial at all,
because of his counsel’s erroneous advice.225 Furthermore, some courts
have found that prejudice is “self-evident” where a noncitizen defendant
faces deportation because of counsel’s errors.226
Even if the Kentucky court does not presume prejudice or find that it is
“self-evident” in Padilla’s case, Padilla can still prevail. To succeed,
Padilla must demonstrate that his attorney’s performance affected the plea
process and that his alternative “decision to reject the plea bargain would
217

Id. at 485.
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 471.
219
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
220
645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
221
Id.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483).
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See United States v. Denedo, NMCCA 9900680, 2010 WL 996432, at *3 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2010) (“In many guilty plea cases the prejudice inquiry will involve a
determination whether without counsel’s error, counsel would have made a different
recommendation as to the plea.” (citing United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 247 (C.A.A.F.
1997))).
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Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000).
226
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frometa, 531 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
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have been rational under the circumstances.”227 He certainly does not need
to “show that he would have been acquitted at a trial.”228 Padilla’s
counsel’s performance undoubtedly affected the plea process: Padilla
argued that he was “substantially induced by his attorney’s mistaken advice
regarding his immigration status.”229
Next, Padilla can show that a decision to go to trial would have been
rational. Unlike the defendant in Hill, Padilla can allege “special
circumstances” to support the conclusion that he would place “particular
emphasis” on his immigration status in deciding whether to plead guilty. 230
The Supreme Court has stressed on multiple occasions that “[p]reserving
the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to
the client than any potential jail sentence.”231
Simply put, faced with the choice of either going to trial or accepting a
plea bargain that would certainly result in mandatory deportation, a rational
person in Padilla’s position would likely choose to go to trial. Faced with
the same decision and the same “dire immigration consequences,” the Third
Circuit held that the defendant, Orocio, would have reasonably chosen to go
to trial even though he faced an aggravated felony charge with a minimum
ten-year sentence.232 The court thus held that Orocio “alleged sufficient
prejudice under Strickland” to warrant a remand.233 In the same way, it
would have been reasonable for Padilla to go to trial instead of suffering the
automatic “dire immigration consequences” of a guilty plea, even though he
faced drug trafficking charges. Padilla explicitly raised with counsel his
serious concerns about potential immigration consequences.234 As the
Second Circuit has held, a defendant’s statements regarding what he would
have done in a plea bargain “in combination with some objective evidence,
such as a significant sentencing disparity, is sufficient to support a prejudice
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Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
United States v. Choi, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2008). The Supreme
Court has stated that this is particularly important in cases involving indigent defendants:
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hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the record
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at 486.
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Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Ky. 2008).
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Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985).
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Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (emphasis added) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001)).
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United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 645 (3d Cir. 2011).
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As a Kentucky Supreme Court judge pointed out, Padilla “raised the issue [of
deportation] himself.” Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485 (Cunningham, J., dissenting).
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finding.”235 Here, Padilla’s statements in combination with the objective
evidence—certain deportation from his home of forty years, the United
States—should be sufficient to support a prejudice finding.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many questions remain following the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Padilla v. Kentucky, including whether it should have retroactive effect and
whether Padilla was prejudiced. Federal circuit courts recently deciding the
issue are split, indicating that the Supreme Court may have to revisit its
decision.
This Comment argued that Padilla should be applied
retroactively because it did not announce a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure, but rather applied the existing Strickland v. Washington
standard of effective assistance of counsel to a new set of facts. On remand
to the Kentucky Supreme Court, Padilla should prevail on his Strickland
claim.
Immigration law in the United States today can have devastating
consequences for individuals and families—its growing use as a tool for
deportation separates families, uproots the working lives of thousands of
people, and has significant consequences for the economy of a country so
dependent on foreign labor. How the questions remaining from Padilla
play out in the coming months and years will tell much about how the legal
system’s treatment of noncitizens in criminal proceedings is likely to
unfold. Padilla may come to signal the legal community’s recognition of
the close link between immigration and criminal law. It may also signal
that the legal community is moving further toward acknowledging that
criminal punishment for a noncitizen is different from punishment for a
citizen. Practically speaking, however, few defendants may actually feel
Padilla’s impact because the “prejudice” prong of Strickland v. Washington
is often difficult to prove.
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United States v. Brown, 623 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Pham v. United States, 317 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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